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Abstract. We describe an ad hoc voting scheme that allows any group of people to very easily
cast electronic votes in ad hoc settings. One of the challenges of online voting schemes is to ensure
security and privacy. We propose a new approach, the ad hoc voting pattern, that meets these
requirements. To show the feasibility of the proposed solution we implemented such a scheme on
the Android platform. Moreover, due to the access point functionality of modern smartphones
and the fact that the proposed scheme runs completely on an ad hoc fashion, the implemented
scheme does not require internet access.
1 Introduction
The last decade has seen a clear shift from traditional mass communication to modern
and personalized interactions. Mobile devices and ad hoc relations play an important
role in this shift. As such, new protocols and schemes have been designed in order to
provide secure, user-friendly and robust applications. An example of such applications
is electronic voting, also known as e-voting, designed to provide an alternative and fast
way of voting.
Electronic voting schemes must provide the same security properties as traditional
paper ballot voting. The security requirements of such protocols include integrity, voter
authentication, and ballot secrecy. These represent a big challenge for ad hoc networks
since it is easy to eavesdrop on connections or tamper with protocols by connecting
extra devices wirelessly. Integrity is one of the most important requirements for a vot-
ing protocol: no one should be able to tamper with votes. Also ballot secrecy is very
important, as it enables sincere voting, by mitigating external factors such as coercion,
social pressure, intimidation and bribery.
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Fig. 1: Ad Hoc Voting Pattern - (a) Registration stage, (b)+(c) Voting stage, (d) Count-
ing stage.
An electronic voting scheme following the ad hoc voting pattern can be thought of
as the following three-stage protocol: 1. Acquire an ephemeral identity using a blind
signature scheme (Figure 1a); 2. Vote using this identity and distribute the secret ballot
using secret sharing (Figures 1b and 1c); and 3. Combine all secret fragments to calculate
the result (Figure 1d).
Our work covers the analysis of existing e-voting schemes present in the literature,
and a new general ad hoc voting pattern, inspired by Parakh and Kak [11]. We also
propose a new scheme, that instantiates this pattern.
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce some of the existing e-voting
schemes in Section 2. Next, we generalize Parakh and Kak’s [11] proposal to a three-
stage pattern, Section 3. We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed scheme by
an Android implementation described briefly in Section 4. We conclude the paper in
Section 5.
1.1 Related Work
Kiayias and Yung [10] define requirements for boardroom elections and a protocol that
matches these requirements. This is first improved upon by Groth [8] and then by Hao
et al [9]. However, even their scheme [9] becomes inefficient for elections with many
candidates, as the computational complexity of tallying grows exponentially in the
number of candidates.
Helios [1] is a web-based implementation of an e-voting scheme based on Benaloh’s
simple verifiable elections [4]. This implementation has shown to be successful [2]. A
downside of Helios is that it needs an external voting server to host the election.
All of the voting schemes mentioned above use some form of ElGamal encryption
[7], due to its homomorphic properties, and zero-knowledge proofs [6]. The latter are
typically used to show that ballots were formed correctly.
Parakh and Kak proposed a voting scheme based on implicit data security [11].
The scheme has security flaws of which the most devastating is that anyone can vote
multiple times because of a broken signature scheme. Despite its weaknesses, their work
inspired the ad hoc voting pattern proposed in this paper.
2 Technical Background
There are several cryptographic primitives that allow one to create secure e-voting
schemes. In this section we provide a description of two different primitives: Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme and Schnorr’s blind signature scheme.
2.1 Notation
In the remainder of this paper we will use the following notation. We write a ∈R A to
denote that a is chosen uniformly at random from the set A. Furthermore, we write Zq
for the group consisting of the integers modulo a prime q.
2.2 Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme can be used to make t-out-of-n sharing of a secret
s. Such a sharing consists of n shares, one for each party. The secret s can only be
recovered when at least t parties combine their shares. The mathematical principle
behind Shamir’s secret sharing is that to reconstruct a polynomial of degree t− 1, one
needs at least t points on this polynomial. By encoding the secret in the polynomial,
usually as the constant coefficient, one obtains a secret sharing scheme.
2.2.1 Distribution More precisely, the Shamir’s Secret Sharing Distribution algo-
rithm SSSD(s, t, n) to create a t-out-of-n secret sharing of a secret s ∈ Zq consists of
the following steps.
1. Choose coefficients a1, . . . , at−1 ∈R Zq and define the degree t − 1 polynomial by
f(x) = s + a1x + . . . at−1xt−1.
2. Create the n secret shares si by setting si = f(i).
2.2.2 Reconstruction Given a subset of t shares si, i ∈ I it is possible to recon-
struct the polynomial f and hence recover the secret s. Generally, the polynomial is
reconstructed using Lagrange polynomials, but since we are only interested in f(0) we
only need the following Lagrange coefficients:
lIj =
∏
i∈I\{j}
i
i− j
Then the secret s can be recovered by setting s = f(0) =
∑
i∈I l
I
j si.
2.3 Schnorr Blind Signature Scheme
In traditional digital signatures the signer knows the message it is going to sign. How-
ever, in a blind signature scheme the signer can sign a message without knowing that
message. We use this in our voting pattern because this allows us to decouple registra-
tion, where you are identifiable, from voting, where you want to be anonymous.
The first example of a blind signature scheme is described by Chaum [5]. In this
paper we use Schnorr’s blind signature scheme. It is a variant of Schnorr’s identification
protocol. Consider a signer with private key x and public key h = gx. In Figure 2 we
show how this signer blindly signs a message m held by the recipient. In the following we
write (c′, r′) = SBSSign(x,m) to denote this interactive protocol. The blind signature
can then be verified by checking whether c′ ?= H(gr′y−c′ mod p‖m). This scheme is
provably secure if H is modelled as a random oracle [3].
Signer Recipient
Secret: x Message: m
w ∈R Z∗q
a := gw (mod p)
a−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ α, β ∈R Zq
a′ := a · gαyβ (mod p)
c′ := H(a′‖m)
c←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− c := c′ + β (mod q)
r := c · x+ w (mod q) r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ a ?≡ gr · y−c (mod p)
r′ := r + α (mod q)
Signature: (c′, r′)
Fig. 2: Messages exchanged between Signer, with private key x and public key y = gx
and Recipient in order create a blind signature of the message m. The values p, q, g are
system parameters1, and H is a cryptographic hash function mapping strings onto Zq.
2.4 Voting scheme properties
Despite the variety of e-voting schemes that exists, most try to achieve the same set
of security properties. The security properties for electronic vote can be categorized in
two groups: correctness requirements and privacy requirements. A reliable scheme must
provide the same level of correctness as the traditional paper ballot voting. The idea of
reliable systems is based on the accuracy of the scheme, its integrity and democracy.
1 An instantiation of such parameters can be found in Section 3.2.1.
Fig. 3: The Ad Hoc Voting Pattern in 8 steps. The registration authority (RA) registers
eligible voters, the online polling booth (OPB) enables voting and tallies the votes
afterwards, and the voting servers (VS) register the votes.
On the other hand, a system can be considered as privacy-friendly if it assures ballot
secrecy and anonymity.
Schneier [12], introduced these security properties in the scope of the electronic
voting by defining the following requirements: S1 - Only authorized voters can vote
and at most once (eligibility)2; S2 - No one can determine what anyone else voted
(ballot secrecy); S3 - No one can change anyone else’s vote without being discovered
(integrity); S4 - No one can duplicate anyone else’s vote (integrity); S5 - Each voter
can verify that his/her vote was counted (verifiability).
3 Ad Hoc Voting scheme
The proposed solution is a voting scheme that operates in an ad hoc scenario. In this
section, we start by providing an overview of the ad hoc voting pattern, followed by an
instantiation. Finally, we analyze the security of the scheme.
The system contains four types of parties: voters, one registration authority (RA),
one online polling booth (OPB) and n voting servers (VS). In the following we assume
that we always require at least t voting servers to provide final results. For an ad hoc
voting scheme, we propose to have every voter to simultaneously act as a voting server.
3.1 Ad hoc voting pattern
The proposed voting scheme can be described as a three stage protocol. The steps of
each stage are depicted in Figure 3.
The first stage is the registration stage. First the voter authenticates him- or herself
to the registration authority (step 1). If the voter is eligible, the RA will blindly sign a
random identity generated by the voter (step 2).
2 Schneier divides S1 into two different requirements. We decided to formalize it as one since both requirements
are related to eligibility.
The second stage is the voting stage. The online polling booth (OPB) will verify the
blind signature to determine eligibility (step 3). The blindness of the signature ensures
that the OPB and the RA cannot collude to recover the identity of the voter. Only
the random identity is known to the OPB. Also, the voter will send a key to the OPB
(step 3), which will then be forwarded to the voting servers (VS) (step 4), to allow the
voter to access the VSs. Finally, the voter creates its ballot and creates n shares using
a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme (step 5). It uses its key to send these shares securely
to each of the VSs (step 6).
When all votes have been cast the OPB closes, and initiates the counting phase. The
OPB collects at least t shares of each ballot and reconstructs the original vote (step
7). Each ballot is counted and the final result is published (step 8). In the end, the
secret shares are published allowing the voters to verify that their ballot was correctly
counted.
3.2 Ad hoc voting scheme
After a high-level overview over the ad hoc voting pattern, we provide the detailed
description of scheme, where we use explicit cryptographic primitives. We start by
setting up the system parameters necessary for the cryptographic primitives and then
we proceed with the description of each stage.
3.2.1 Set up To setup the system, first generate two primes p and q of 1024 and 160
bits respectively, such that q divides p− 1. Next, fix a generator g mod p, such that
g has order q in Zp, and publish the parameters p, q and g. Next, the RA generates
a private key x ∈R Zq and publishes its public key y = gx mod p. Furthermore, each
of the voting servers generates a private key ui and publishes its public key hi = g
ui
mod p.
3.2.2 Registration stage In the registration stage the voter authenticates itself
with the RA and obtains a blind signature on a random identity that will be used to
cast the vote. Concretely this can be implemented as follows.
1. The voter authenticates itself to the RA and sends it a random identity rid = g
r
with r ∈R Zq.
2. The RA verifies the eligibility of the voter, and aborts if the voter is not eligible.
3. The voter and the RA simultaneously execute the SBSSign(x, rid) protocol. In the
end the voter has a signature (c, r) on its random identity.
3.2.3 Voting stage At the beginning of the voting stage the voter creates an
ephemeral private key vi and sets its public key to Vi = g
vi mod p. It sends its random
identity rid, the signature (c, r) on that identity, and its public key to the OPB. If the
signature is valid, the OBP forwards the public key to the VSs to allow the identity rid
to cast a vote. The VSs only accept these messages from the OBP.
To cast its ballot b, the voter creates Shamir secret shares (b1, . . . , bn) = SSSD(b, t, n)
of this ballot. Then, it calculates a shared key ki = h
vi
i with voting server i. First, the
voter identifies itself to voting server i by sending rid, and then it sends the share bi
encrypted using ki. The voting server can derive the same key by setting ki = V
ui
i , and
thus can store the vote (bi, rid).
3.2.4 Counting stage In this phase, the OPB collects all the ballot pieces from t
VSs and reconstructs the ballots using Shamir’s secret sharing reconstruction scheme.
Now, the OPB simply tallies the ballots and publishes the result together with the
polynomials (indexed by rid). This allows every user to verify that his vote was correctly
counted.
3.3 Analysis of security requirements
In section 2.4 we presented a list of requirements for electronic voting schemes. We now
show how our ad hoc voting scheme meets such requirements.
The requirement S1 is met because to cast a vote one needs a signed anonymous
identity, and only the RA can produce these signatures. The RA will only sign an
anonymous identity for eligible voters. Furthermore, the RA will only sign one anony-
mous identity for each voter, and with a single anonymous identity only one vote can
be cast.
A voter only shows its true identity to the RA, over a secure channel. This means
that the RA is the only one that knows a true identity. However, the RA never learns the
anonymous identity of the voter, because it blindly signs it. All other steps always refer
to this anonymous identity, hence the true identity remains hidden. Thus requirement
S2 is satisfied.
At least t VSs need to cooperate in order to change a ballot. The properties of the
secret sharing scheme ensure that any smaller coalition can only randomize the ballot,
which with only very low probability will give a valid ballot again. So requirement S3
is also satisfied.
As long as less than t VSs are corrupted, duplicating someone else’s vote is impossi-
ble, S4 . To duplicate a vote, one has to know the vote. This vote is distributed over all
VSs, and t shares are required to reconstruct the vote. If less than t VSs are corrupted,
the vote cannot be determined and can therefore not be copied.
At the end of the voting phase, the OPB publishes the final result, as well as a
list of all the polynomials received. This allows every voter to verify whether his vote,
identified by the polynomial, is included in the list (S5 ). Furthermore, each voter can
verify if all the reconstructed polynomials contain a valid f(0). This allows a voter to
verify that the sharing and reconstruction algorithms for all polynomials were correctly
executed and that no one tried to tamper individual shares, S3 .
4 Implementation
We implemented the ad hoc voting scheme on the Android platform. One device will
act as the host, and perform the tasks of the RA and OPB. Having one device carrying
out both tasks is secure under the assumption that the communication channel does
not reveal anything about the identity. This device is excluded from voting. Every
voter will also act as VS. TCP connections are used for all the communication. In
practice one should use transport layer security, which has been omitted for this proof-
of-concept. The threshold used in Shamir’s Secret Sharing is equal to the number of
voting servers, which means that, unless all voting servers are corrupted, ballots cannot
be reconstructed. Our proof-of-concept uses open authentication, which means that
anyone able to connect to the RA is able to vote. Since modern smartphones can
function as a Wi-Fi access point, an ad hoc network hosted by one of the smartphones
can be used to perform the voting.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed the ad hoc voting pattern, a new approach to ad hoc voting based on
anonymous identities and secret sharing. An instantiation of this pattern has been given,
based on Schnorr’s blind signatures and Shamir’s secret sharing, which fulfils desired
properties such as ballot secrecy, eligibility, integrity and verifiability. One can easily
think of other instantiations using different cryptographic primitives. For future work
it would be interesting to analyze different instantiations and analyze their security.
This might allow us to make the security requirements posed on the blind signature
scheme and the secret sharing scheme more explicit. One could also research different
authentication models, for example using out-of-band channels like NFC. Finally, it
would be interesting to make a fully secure implementation of the ad hoc voting scheme.
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